# -*- text -*-
##
##  eap.conf -- Configuration for EAP types (PEAP, TTLS, etc.)
##
##	$Id: c35c7007794844bb380fc38785306a21397b51e9 $

#######################################################################
#
#  Whatever you do, do NOT set 'Auth-Type := EAP'.  The server is smart enough
#  to figure this out on its own.
#
#  The most common side effect of setting 'Auth-Type := EAP' is that the users
#  then cannot use ANY other authentication method.
#
eap {
	#
	#  Invoke the default supported EAP type when EAP-Identity response is
	#  received.
	#
	#  The incoming EAP messages DO NOT specify which EAP type they will be
	#  using, so it MUST be set here.
	#
	#  For now, only one default EAP type may be used at a time.
	#
	#  If the EAP-Type attribute is set by another module, then that EAP
	#  type takes precedence over the default type configured here.
	#
	default_eap_type = md5

	#
	#  There are many EAP types, but the server has support for only a
	#  limited subset.  If the server receives a request for an EAP type it
	#  does not support, then it normally rejects the request.  By setting
	#  this configuration to "yes", you can tell the server to instead keep
	#  processing the request.  Another module MUST then be configured to
	#  proxy the request to another RADIUS server which supports that EAP
	#  type.
	#
	#  If another module is NOT configured to handle the request, then the
	#  request will still end up being rejected.
	#
	ignore_unknown_eap_types = no

	#
	#  Cisco AP1230B firmware 12.2(13)JA1 has a bug.  When given a User-Name
	#  attribute in an Access-Accept, it copies one more byte than it should.
	#
	#  We can work around it by configurably adding an extra zero byte.
	#
	cisco_accounting_username_bug = no

	#
	#  Supported EAP-types
	#

	#
	#  We do NOT recommend using EAP-MD5 authentication for wireless
	#  connections.  It is insecure, and does not provide for dynamic WEP
	#  keys or WPA enterprise.
	#
	md5 {
	}

	## EAP-PWD (Secure password-based authentication)
	#
#	pwd {
#		group = 19

#		server_id = theserver@example.com

		#
		#  This has the same meaning as for TLS.
		#
#		fragment_size = 1020

		#
		#  The virtual server which determines the "known good" password
		#  for the user. Note that unlike TLS, only the "authorize"
		#  section is processed.  EAP-PWD requests can be distinguished
		#  by having a User-Name, but no User-Password, CHAP-Password,
		#  EAP-Message, etc.
		#
#		virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"
#	}

	## Cisco LEAP
	#
	#  We do not recommend using LEAP in new deployments.  See:
	#  http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5TP012ACKE.html
	#
	#  Cisco LEAP uses the MS-CHAP algorithm (but not the MS-CHAP
	#  attributes) to perform it's authentication.
	#
	#  As a result, LEAP *requires* access to the plain-text User-Password,
	#  or the NT-Password attributes. 'System' authentication is impossible
	#  with LEAP.
	#
	leap {
	}

	## Generic Token Card.
	#
	#  Currently, this is only permitted inside of EAP-TTLS, or EAP-PEAP.
	#  The module "challenges" the user with text, and the response from the
	#  user is taken to be the User-Password.
	#
	#  Proxying the tunneled EAP-GTC session is a bad idea, the users
	#  password will go over the wire in plain-text, for anyone to see.
	#
	gtc {
		#  The default challenge, which many clients ignore..
#		challenge = "Password: "

		#
		#  The plain-text response which comes back is put into a
		#  User-Password attribute, and passed to another module for
		#  authentication.  This allows the EAP-GTC response to be
		#  checked against plain-text, or crypt'd passwords.
		#
		#  If you say "Local" instead of "PAP", then the module will
		#  look for a User-Password configured for the request, and do
		#  the authentication itself.
		#
		auth_type = PAP
	}

	## Common TLS configuration for TLS-based EAP types
	#
	#  See raddb/certs/README for additional comments on certificates.
	#
	#  If OpenSSL was not found at the time the server was built, the "tls",
	#  "ttls", and "peap" sections will be ignored.
	#
	#  If you do not currently have certificates signed by a trusted CA you
	#  may use the 'snakeoil' certificates. Included with the server in
	#  raddb/certs.
	#
	#  If these certificates have not been auto-generated:
	#
	#    cd raddb/certs
	#    make
	#
	#  These test certificates SHOULD NOT be used in a normal deployment.
	#  They are created only to make it easier to install the server, and to
	#  perform some simple tests with EAP-TLS, TTLS, or PEAP.
	#
	#  See also:
	#
	#    http://www.dslreports.com/forum/remark,9286052~mode=flat
	#
	#  Note that you should NOT use a globally known CA here! e.g. using a
	#  Verisign cert as a "known CA" means that ANYONE who has a certificate
	#  signed by them can authenticate via EAP-TLS!  This is likely not what
	#  you want.
	#
	tls-config tls-common {
		private_key_password = whatever
		private_key_file = ${certdir}/server.pem

		#
		#  If Private key & Certificate are located in the same file,
		#  then private_key_file & certificate_file must contain the
		#  same file name.
		#
		#  If ca_file (below) is not used, then the certificate_file
		#  below MUST include not only the server certificate, but ALSO
		#  all of the CA certificates used to sign the server
		#  certificate.
		#
		#  Any certificate chain MUST be in order from server
		#  certificate (first in the file) to intermediaries (second) to
		#  root CA (last in the file) as per RFC 4346 (see
		#  certificate_list
		#  http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-7.4.2 )
		#
		certificate_file = ${certdir}/server.pem

		#
		#  Server certificate may also be specified at runtime on a per
		#  session basis.  Here, the certificate file must consist
		#  of the certificate and private key, PEM encoded, with no
		#  password or the password set above.
		#
		#  The file should be provided as the attribute:
		#
		#      &control:TLS-Session-Cert-File
		#
		#  If there are any errors, authentication will not continue.
		#
		#  This can be used to periodically verify correct supplicant
		#  behaviour, by presenting an untrusted or invalid server
		#  certificate and verifying that the supplicant returns the
		#  correct TLS alert (available in Module-Failure-Message).
		#
		#  Note that after receiving a fatal alert, TLS negotiation
		#  cannot continue, but as most supplicants retry
		#  enthusiastically this probably won't be an issue.
		#

		#
		#  Trusted Root CA list
		#
		#  ALL of the CA's in this list will be trusted to issue client
		#  certificates for authentication.
		#
		#  You should not use a public CA here.  This should either be
		#  set to a certificate chain for your institution's CA
		#  or a self signed Root CA.
		#
		ca_file = ${cadir}/ca.pem

		#
	 	#  OpenSSL will automatically create certificate chains, unless
	 	#  we tell it to not do that.  The problem is that it sometimes
	 	#  gets the chains right from a certificate signature view, but
	 	#  wrong from the clients view.
	 	#
		#  When setting "auto_chain = no", the server certificate file
		#  MUST include the full certificate chain.
		#
#		auto_chain = yes

		#
		#  If OpenSSL supports TLS-PSK, then we can use a PSK identity
		#  and (hex) password.  When the following two configuration
		#  items are specified, then certificate-based configuration
		#  items are not allowed.  e.g.:
		#
		#	private_key_password
		#	private_key_file
		#	certificate_file
		#	ca_file
		#	ca_path
		#
		#  For now, the identity is fixed, and must be the same on the
		#  client.  The passphrase must be a hex value, and can be up to
		#  256 hex digits.
		#
		#  Future versions of the server may be able to look up the
		#  shared key (hexphrase) based on the identity.
		#
#		psk_identity = "test"
#		psk_hexphrase = "036363823"

		#
		#  For DH cipher suites to work, you have to run OpenSSL to
		#  create the DH file first:
		#
		#  	openssl dhparam -out certs/dh 2048
		#
		dh_file = ${certdir}/dh

		#
		#  If your system doesn't have /dev/urandom, you will need to
		#  create this file, and periodically change its contents.
		#
		#  For security reasons, FreeRADIUS doesn't write to files in
		#  its configuration directory.
		#
#		random_file = /dev/urandom

		#
		#  This can never exceed the size of a RADIUS packet (4096
		#  bytes), and is preferably half that, to accommodate other
		#  attributes in RADIUS packet.  On most APs the MAX packet
		#  length is configured between 1500 - 1600 In these cases,
		#  fragment size should be 1024 or less.
		#
#		fragment_size = 1024

		#
		#  Check the Certificate Revocation List
		#
		#  Will check CRLs for all certificates in the certificate chain.
		#
		#  1) Copy CA certificates and CRLs to same directory.
		#  2) Execute 'c_rehash <CA certs&CRLs Directory>'. 'c_rehash' is
		#     OpenSSL's command.
		#  3) uncomment the lines below.
		#  4) Restart radiusd
		#
#		check_crl = yes

		ca_path = ${cadir}

		#
		#  If check_cert_issuer is set, the value will be checked
		#  against the DN of the issuer in the client certificate.  If
		#  the values do not match, the certificate verification will
		#  fail, rejecting the user.
		#
		#  In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done more generally by
		#  checking the value of the TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer attribute.
		#  This check can be done via any mechanism you choose.
		#
#		check_cert_issuer = "/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd"

		#
		#  If check_cert_cn is set, the value will be xlat'ed and
		#  checked against the CN in the client certificate.  If the
		#  values do not match, the certificate verification will fail
		#  rejecting the user.
		#
		#  This check is done only if the previous "check_cert_issuer"
		#  is not set, or if the check succeeds.
		#
		#  In 2.1.10 and later, this check can be done more generally by
		#  checking the value of the TLS-Client-Cert-CN attribute.
		#  This check can be done via any mechanism you choose.
		#
#		check_cert_cn = %{User-Name}

		#
		# Set this option to specify the allowed TLS cipher suites.
		# The format is listed in "man 1 ciphers".
		#
		cipher_list = "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2"

		#
		#  Work-arounds for OpenSSL nonsense OpenSSL 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g do
		#  not calculate the EAP keys correctly.  The fix is to upgrade
		#  OpenSSL, or disable TLS 1.2 here.
		#
#		disable_tlsv1_2 = yes

		#
		#  Elliptical cryptography configuration
		#
		#  Only for OpenSSL >= 0.9.8.f
		#
		ecdh_curve = "prime256v1"

		#
		#  TLS Session resumption
		#
		#  We currently support RFC 5246 style TLS session resumption
		#  only.
		#
		#  Once authentication has completed the TLS client is provided
		#  with a unique session identifier (or cookie) that it may
		#  present during its next authentication attempt.
		#
		#  Presenting this identifier allows the client to skip the
		#  majority of TLS tunnel setup during its next authentication
		#  session.
		#
		#  Resuming a TLS session avoids the certificate exchange and in
		#  the case PEAP and TTLS, allows the client to skip the inner
		#  EAP method.
		#
		#  Enabling Session-Resumption is highly recommended for sites
		#  using slow authentication backends such as winbindd/Active
		#  Directory, and for access federations operating over the
		#  internet, such as Eduroam.
		#
		#  Note: You must ensure any attributes required for policy
		#  decisions are cached at the same time as the TLS session
		#  data.  If using the default tls-cache virtual server and
		#  cache module config, policy attributes may be stored in the
		#  &session-state: list.
		#
		cache {
			#
			#  To enable session resumption, uncomment the virtual
			#  server entry below, and link
			#  sites-available/tls-cache to sites-enabled/tls-cache.
			#
			#  You can disallow resumption for a particular user by
			#  adding the following attribute to the control item
			#  list:
			#
			#    Allow-Session-Resumption = No
			#
			#  If no virtual_server is specified you CANNOT enable
			#  resumption for just one user by setting the above
			#  attribute to "yes".
			#
#			virtual_server = 'tls-cache'

			#
			#  Name of the context TLS sessions are created under.
			#  If no value is provided the context is set to the EAP
			#  module instance.
			#
			#  If you wish to share session resumption data between
			#  multiple EAP modules they all must have the same name
			#  value set.
			#
#			name = 'shared_session_context'

			#
			#  The period for which a resumable session remains valid.
			#  The actual period is the lower of this value, and the
			#  ttl set in rlm_cache.
			#
			#  Default is 24hrs inline with RFC4346.
			#
#			lifetime = 86400

			#
			#  Revalidate client's certificate chain each time a session
			#  is resumed.
			#
			#  Intermediaries provided by the client are not cached,
			#  or copied to the server's certificate store, so
			#  rebuilding the certificate chain will fail if we don't
			#  have the intermediaries loaded from ca_file or ca_path.
			#
			#  This is useful with long cache lifetimes, where a
			#  certificate may be revoked in the interim between the
			#  session being created and re-used.
			#
#			verify = no

			#
			#  Only allow session resumption if an extended master
			#  secret has been created.  This requires client support.
			#
			#  Extended Master Secrets (RFC 7627) are required to
			#  prevent a MITM attack, where the attacker can resume
			#  a session if it can insert itself into the path between
			#  the TLS client and TLS server.
			#
			#    https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE
			#
			#  Note: This attack is undetectable by the client.
			#  Note: Only supported with OpenSSL >= 1.1.0
			#
#			require_extended_master_secret = yes

			#
			#  Only allow session resumption if a cipher which would
			#  allow perfect forward secrecy has been selected.
			#
			#  Note: Only enforced with OpenSSL >= 1.1.0
			#
#			require_perfect_forward_secrecy = no

			#  As of 3.1 OpenSSL's internal cache has been disabled due to
			#  scoping/threading issues.
			#
			#  The following configuration options are deprecated:
			#
			#    enable
			#    persist_dir
			#    max_entries
			#
		}

		#
		#  As of version 2.1.10, client certificates can be validated
		#  via an external command.  This allows dynamic CRLs or OCSP to
		#  be used.
		#
		#  This configuration is commented out in the default
		#  configuration.  Uncomment it, and configure the correct paths
		#  below to enable it.
		#
		verify {
			#
			#  A temporary directory where the client certificates
			#  are stored.  This directory MUST be owned by the UID
			#  of the server, and MUST not be accessible by any
			#  other users.  When the server starts, it will do
			#  "chmod go-rwx" on the directory, for security
			#  reasons.  The directory MUST exist when the server
			#  starts.
			#
			#  You should also delete all of the files in the
			#  directory when the server starts.
			#
#			tmpdir = /tmp/radiusd

			#
			#  The command used to verify the client cert. We
			#  recommend using the OpenSSL command-line tool.
			#
			#  The ${..ca_path} text is a reference to the ca_path
			#  variable defined above.
			#
			#  The %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename} is the name of the
			#  temporary file containing the cert in PEM format.
			#  This file is automatically deleted by the server when
			#  the command returns.
			#
#			client = "/path/to/openssl verify -CApath ${..ca_path} %{TLS-Client-Cert-Filename}"
		}

		#
		#  OCSP Configuration
		#
		#  Certificates can be verified against an OCSP Responder.
		#  This makes it possible to immediately revoke certificates without
		#  the distribution of new Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
		#
		#  In addition to the configuration items below, the behaviour of
		#  OCSP can be altered by runtime attributes.
		#
		#  If OCSP is enabled, the &reply:TLS-OCSP-Cert-Valid attribute will
		#  be added after OCSP completes.  One of the following values will
		#  be set:
		#
		#    - no      OCSP responder indicated the certificate is not valid.
		#    - yes     OCSP responder indicated the certificate is valid.
		#    - skipped OCSP checks were skipped.
		#
		#  If an OCSP check is performed, the &reply:TLS-OCSP-Next-Update
		#  attribute will also be added.  The value of this will attribute
		#  be the number of seconds until the certificate state need be refreshed.
		#  This can be used as a Cache-TTL value if you wish to use the cache
		#  module to store OCSP certificate validation status.
		#
		#  If when the OCSP check is performed, a &control:TLS-OCSP-Cert-Valid
		#  attribute is present, its value will force the outcome of the OCSP
		#  check, and the OCSP responder will not be contacted.
		#  Values map to the following OCSP responses:
		#
		#    - no      Invalid.
		#    - yes     Valid.
		#    - skipped If softfail = yes value else invalid.
		#
		ocsp {
			#
			#  Enable it.  The default is "no". Deleting the entire
			#  "ocsp" subsection also disables ocsp checking
			#
#			enable = no

			#
			#  OCSP checks are performed immediately after the
			#  complete certificate is received from the supplicant,
			#  and directly after the attributes from that
			#  certificate are inserted into the request.
			#
			#  In order to retrieve cached OCSP states, a virtual
			#  server must be defined here.
			#
			#  See raddb/sites-available/tls-cache for details.
			#
#			virtual_server = 'tls-cache'

			#
			#  The OCSP Responder URL can be automatically extracted
			#  from the certificate in question. To override the
			#  OCSP Responder URL set "override_cert_url = yes".
			#
			override_cert_url = yes

			#
			#  If the OCSP Responder address is not extracted from
			#  the certificate, the URL can be defined here.
			#
			url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"

			#
			#  If the OCSP Responder can not cope with nonce in the
			#  request, then it can be disabled here.
			#
			#  For security reasons, disabling this option is not
			#  recommended as nonce protects against replay attacks.
			#
			#  Note that Microsoft AD Certificate Services OCSP
			#  Responder does not enable nonce by default. It is more
			#  secure to enable nonce on the responder than to
			#  disable it in the query here. See
			#  http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770413%28WS.10%29.aspx
			#
#			use_nonce = yes

			#
			#  Number of seconds before giving up waiting for OCSP
			#  response. 0 uses system default.
			#
#			timeout = 0

			#
			#  Normally an error in querying the OCSP responder (no
			#  response from server, server did not understand the
			#  request, etc) will result in a validation failure.
			#
			#  To treat these errors as 'soft' failures and still
			#  accept the certificate, enable this option.
			#
			#  Warning: this may enable clients with revoked
			#  certificates to connect if the OCSP responder is not
			#  available. Use with caution.
			#
#			softfail = no
		}


		#
		#  Configures OCSP stapling for server certificates.
		#
		#  If requested, we query either the server listed below (as url),
		#  or the one specified in our server certificate, to retrieve an
		#  OCSP response to pass back to the TLS client.
		#
		#  This allows TLS clients to check for certificate revocation before
		#  divulging credentials to a (possibly rogue) server, that may be
		#  presenting a compromised certificate.
		#
		staple {
			#
			#  Enable it.  The default is "no". Deleting the entire
			#  "ocsp" subsection also disables ocsp checking
			#
#			enable = no

			#
			#  OCSP checks are performed whenever a TLS client includes
			#  an OCSP stapling extension.
			#
			#  In order to retrieve cached OCSP staples, a virtual
			#  server must be defined here.
			#
			#  The same virtual server can be used for caching
			#  client OCSP response states, and stapling information.
			#
			#  See raddb/sites-available/tls-cache for details.
			#
#			virtual_server = 'tls-cache'

			#
			#  The OCSP Responder URL can be automatically extracted
			#  from the certificate in question. To override the
			#  OCSP Responder URL set "override_cert_url = yes".
			#
			override_cert_url = yes

			#
			#  If the OCSP Responder address is not extracted from
			#  the certificate, the URL can be defined here.
			#
			url = "http://127.0.0.1/ocsp/"

			#
			#  If the OCSP Responder can not cope with nonce in the
			#  request, then it can be disabled here.
			#
			#  For security reasons, disabling this option is not
			#  recommended as nonce protects against replay attacks.
			#
			#  Note that Microsoft AD Certificate Services OCSP
			#  Responder does not enable nonce by default. It is more
			#  secure to enable nonce on the responder than to
			#  disable it in the query here. See
			#  http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc770413%28WS.10%29.aspx
			#
#			use_nonce = yes

			#
			#  Number of seconds before giving up waiting for OCSP
			#  response. 0 uses system default.
			#
#			timeout = 0

			#
			#  Normally if we can't query the OCSP Responder
			#  we issue a fatal alert, and abort.  Set this to true
			#  to allow the session to continue without an OCSP
			#  stapling response being sent to the TLS client.
			#
#			softfail = no
		}
	}

	## EAP-TLS
	#
	#  As of Version 3.0, the TLS configuration for TLS-based
	#  EAP types is above in the "tls-config" section.
	#
	tls {
		# Point to the common TLS configuration
		tls = tls-common

		#
		#  EAP-TLS can work without a client certificate, but situations
		#  whether this is useful are quite limited.
		#
		#  Currently only the Hotspot 2.0 R2 standard utilises EAP-TLS
		#  without a peer certificate.
		#
		#  This is to secure the SSID used to provide connectivity to the OSU
		#  (Online Signup Server).
		#
		#  You can override this option by setting:
		#
		#	EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes/No
		#
		#  in the control items for a request.
		#
#		require_client_cert = yes

		#
		#  Include_length is a flag which is by default set to yes If
		#  set to yes, Total Length of the message is included in EVERY
		#  packet we send. If set to no, Total Length of the message is
		#  included ONLY in the First packet of a fragment series.
		#
#		include_length = yes

		#
		#  As part of checking a client certificate, the EAP-TLS sets
		#  some attributes such as TLS-Client-Cert-CN. This virtual
		#  server has access to these attributes, and can be used to
		#  accept or reject the request.
		#
#		virtual_server = check-eap-tls
	}

	## EAP-TTLS
	#
	#  Note: To use EAP-TTLS you must also configure an inner method in
	#  mods-enabled/eap_inner.
	#
	#  The TTLS module implements the EAP-TTLS protocol, which can be
	#  described as EAP inside of Diameter, inside of TLS, inside of EAP,
	#  inside of RADIUS...
	#
	#  Surprisingly, it works quite well.
	#
	#  When using PAP, GTC, or MSCAHPv2 as an inner method EAP-TTLS is
	#  only secure if the supplicant is configured to validate the the
	#  server certificate presented.
	#
	#  It is trivial to retrieve the user's credentials from these inner
	#  methods, if the user connects to a rogue server.
	#
	ttls {
		#
		#  Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters
		#  are in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
		#
		#  In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS
		#  v2.x is being used, all the options of the tls-config
		#  section may also appear instead in the 'tls' section
		#  above. If that is done, the tls= option here (and in
		#  tls above) MUST be commented out.
		#
		tls = tls-common

		#
		#  copy_request_to_tunnel has been removed in 3.2.0
		#
		#  Attributes from the outer request may be accessed with:
		#
		#	&outer:request:<attribute>
		#
		#  The old behaviour may be emulated by adding the following
		#  to the top of the authorize section of the inner tunnel.
		#
		#	update {
		#		&request: += &reply:[*]
		#	}
		#

		#  
		#  use_tunneled_reply has been removed in 3.2.0	
		# 
		#  Attributes that should be provided in the reply should
		#  be copied to the outer.session-state list.
		#
		# 	update outer.session-state {
		#		...
		#
		#	}
		#
		#  In the post-auth section of the outer server, these attributes
		#  can then be copied to the reply list.
		#
		#  If you want to copy the entire session-state list to the reply
		#  the following statement may be used:
		#
		#	update {
		#		&reply: += &session-state:[*]
		#	}
		#

		#
		#  The inner tunneled request can be sent through a virtual
		#  server constructed specifically for this purpose.
		#
		#  If this entry is commented out, the inner tunneled request
		#  will be sent through the virtual server that processed the
		#  outer requests.
		#
		virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"

		#
		#  This has the same meaning, and overwrites, the same field in
		#  the "tls" configuration, above. The default value here is
		#  "yes".
		#
#		include_length = yes

		#
		#  EAP-TTLS does not require a client certificate.
		#  However, you can require one by setting the
		#  following option. You can also override this option by
		#  setting
		#
		#	EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
		#
		#  in the control items for a request.
		#
#		require_client_cert = yes
	}


	## EAP-PEAP
	#
	###########################################################################
	#
	#  !!!!!             WARNINGS for Windows compatibility               !!!!!
	#
	###########################################################################
	#
	#  If you see the server send an Access-Challenge, and the client never
	#  sends another Access-Request, then
	#
	#		STOP!
	#
	#  The server certificate has to have special OID's in it, or else the
	#  Microsoft clients will silently fail.  See the "scripts/xpextensions"
	#  file for details, and the following page:
	#
	#	http://support.microsoft.com/kb/814394/en-us
	#
	#  For additional Windows XP SP2 issues, see:
	#
	#	http://support.microsoft.com/kb/885453/en-us
	#
	#  If is still doesn't work, and you're using Samba, you may be
	#  encountering a Samba bug.  See:
	#
	#	https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6563
	#
	#  Note that we do not necessarily agree with their explanation... but
	#  the fix does appear to work.
	#
	##########################################################################

	#
	#
	#  Note: To use EAP-TTLS you must also configure an inner method in
	#  mods-enabled/eap_inner.
	#
	#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type which is separate
	#  from the one for the non-tunneled EAP module.  Inside of the TLS/PEAP
	#  tunnel, we recommend using EAP-MS-CHAPv2.
	#
	#  When using GTC, or MSCAHPv2 as an inner method, PEAP is only secure if
	#  the supplicant is configured to validate the server certificate.
	#
	#  It is trivial to retrieve the user's credentials from these inner
	#  methods, if the user connects to a rogue server.
	#
	peap {
		#
		#  Which tls-config section the TLS negotiation parameters are
		#  in - see EAP-TLS above for an explanation.
		#
		#  In the case that an old configuration from FreeRADIUS v2.x is
		#  being used, all the options of the tls-config section may
		#  also appear instead in the 'tls' section above. If that is
		#  done, the tls= option here (and in tls above) MUST be
		#  commented out.
		#
		tls = tls-common

		#
		#  The tunneled EAP session needs a default EAP type which is
		#  separate from the one for the non-tunneled EAP module.
		#  Inside of the PEAP tunnel, we recommend using MS-CHAPv2, as
		#  that is the default type supported by Windows clients.
		#
		default_eap_type = mschapv2

		#
		#  copy_request_to_tunnel has been removed in 3.2.0
		#
		#  See notes in the ttls section about emulating this behaviour.
		#

		#
		#  use_tunneled_reply has been removed in 3.2.0
		#
		#  See notes in the ttls section about emulating this behaviour.
		#
			
		#
		#  When the tunneled session is proxied, the home server may not
		#  understand EAP-MSCHAP-V2. Set this entry to "no" to proxy the
		#  tunneled EAP-MSCHAP-V2 as normal MSCHAPv2.
		#
#		proxy_tunneled_request_as_eap = yes

		#
		#  The inner tunneled request can be sent through a virtual
		#  server constructed specifically for this purpose.
		#
		#  If this entry is commented out, the inner tunneled request
		#  will be sent through the virtual server that processed the
		#  outer requests.
		#
		virtual_server = "inner-tunnel"

		#
		#  This option enables support for MS-SoH see doc/SoH.txt for
		#  more info. It is disabled by default.
		#
#		soh = yes

		#
		#  The SoH reply will be turned into a request which can be sent
		#  to a specific virtual server:
		#
#		soh_virtual_server = "soh-server"

		#
		#  Unlike EAP-TLS, PEAP does not require a client certificate.
		#  However, you can require one by setting the following
		#  option. You can also override this option by setting
		#
		#	EAP-TLS-Require-Client-Cert = Yes
		#
		#  in the control items for a request.
		#
#		require_client_cert = yes
	}

	#
	#  This takes no configuration.
	#
	#  Note that it is the EAP MS-CHAPv2 sub-module, not the main 'mschap'
	#  module.
	#
	#  Note also that in order for this sub-module to work, the main
	#  'mschap' module MUST ALSO be configured.
	#
	#  This module is the *Microsoft* implementation of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP.
	#  There is another (incompatible) implementation of MS-CHAPv2 in EAP by
	#  Cisco, which FreeRADIUS does not currently support.
	#
	mschapv2 {
		#  Prior to version 2.1.11, the module never sent the
		#  MS-CHAP-Error message to the client.  This worked, but it had
		#  issues when the cached password was wrong.  The server
		#  *should* send "E=691 R=0" to the client, which tells it to
		#  prompt the user for a new password.
		#
		#  The default is to behave as in 2.1.10 and earlier, which is
		#  known to work.  If you set "send_error = yes", then the error
		#  message will be sent back to the client. This *may* help some
		#  clients work better, but *may* also cause other clients to
		#  stop working.
		#
#		send_error = no

		#  Server identifier to send back in the challenge. This should
		#  generally be the host name of the RADIUS server.  Or, some
		#  information to uniquely identify it.
#		identity = "FreeRADIUS"
	}

	## EAP-FAST
	#
	#  Note: To use EAP-FAST you must also configure an inner method in
	#  mods-enabled/eap_inner.  You MUST also set "disable_tlsv1_2 = no".
	#
	#  The FAST module implements the EAP-FAST protocol.
	#
#	fast {
		#  Point to the common TLS configuration
		#
		#  Cipher_list though must include "ADH" for anonymous provisioning.
		#  This is not as straight forward as appending "ADH" alongside
		#  "DEFAULT" as "DEFAULT" contains "!aNULL" so instead it is
		#  recommended "ALL:!EXPORT:!eNULL:!SSLv2" is used
		#
#		tls = tls-common

		#  PAC lifetime in seconds (default: seven days)
		#
		#pac_lifetime = 604800

		#  Authority ID of the server
		#
		#  If you are running a cluster of RADIUS servers, you should make
		#  this and "pac_opaque_key" have the same value on all of the
		#  systems.
		#
#		authority_identity = "1234"

		#  PAC Opaque encryption key (must be exactly 32 bytes in size)
		#
		#  You MUST change this to a random key for security.  Try using:
		#
		#  $ od -vAn -N16 -tx8 < /dev/urandom | sed 's/ //g'
		#
#		pac_opaque_key = "0123456789abcdef0123456789ABCDEF"

		#  Same as for TTLS, PEAP, etc.
		#
#		virtual_server = inner-tunnel
#	}
}
